The sudden dramatic increase of oil revenues in the 1970s did not produce, but it did catalyze, the eruption of an uncoordinated set of protests against Muslim rulers who seemed to accept the dominant and un-Islamic global order. That chain reaction has been dubbed Islamic radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism, or just plain Islamism. Even as Islamic revivalism cannot be separated from the introduction of European commerce in the early modern period at a certain moment in time, so Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism cannot be divorced from the structural realignment of global power—economic and social as well as political and military—that preceded the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There might have been Islamic fundamentalism without OPEC, and economic factors alone do not explain its myriad expressions, yet the global context is crucial to understanding how Islamic fundamentalism has appeared and reappeared during the last quarter of this century.

While petromania was contagious in the 1970s, the tyranny of oil, in Georges Corm’s apt phrase, had begun much earlier. It culminated in the 1970s due to the coincidence of political frustration after the bitter Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 with the overdue readjustment of oil prices leveraged through the newly founded union of oil-producing states named OPEC. OPEC was a union rather than a cartel, as is often supposed. By any standard of proportionality, its members were more than justified in seeking a fairer share of profits for their extraction of a non-renewable resource.

But proportionality, and with it higher profits for OPEC members, did not pave the way to higher status in the international community, nor did it ensure independence from the skills and ambitions of others. The new wealth was monetary. It had to be invested or distributed in a way that would allow these preindustrial societies to enter the postindustrial or high-tech era. The way was never found, in part because financial resources could not be transformed into social restructuring without reliance on the techno-industrial complexes of Europe and America that pioneered modernization even while projecting an “alien” civilization. Genuine independence proved impossible, and in its stead emerged a self-destructive frenzy. Drawn into an economic order where they remain marginal, the principal members of OPEC can only function with the assistance of other, more advanced and more powerful countries. They require foreign assistance in everything from agricultural goods to military weapons to construction projects to transport vehicles. They employ an enormous number of expatriate workers to help them try to keep up with the modern world. Some do recognize the irony of sudden riches. As a Saudi official once lamented, “We Saudis are rich while you Americans are wealthy. I’d rather be wealthy.”

Contd. on page-7

Participants at the meeting, drawn from legal and academic fraternity and social service, unequivocally acknowledged that the proposed bill was certainly an improvement over the previous two bills of 2005 and 2011.

Initiating the discussion, the Chairman of the IOS, Dr Mohammad Manzoor Alam, expressed the confidence that the bill would be introduced by the UPA government in the coming session of Parliament. He said that in order to garner support from non-BJP parties that had opposed the bill earlier, they would be approached to back the bill when it would be taken up for debate in Parliament.

The secular parties that had supported it earlier, would also be impressed upon to facilitate easy passage of the bill. Explaining the purpose for holding the consultative meeting, he said the suggestions made there would be forwarded to the Union Home Minister for incorporation in the bill. He said that the support for the bill gathered momentum with the growing demand from Muslim organisations to enact the anti-communal violence law.

A committee was formed to take a fresh look at the bill and suggest ways to make it more purposeful and deterrent to the eruption of communal violence. The former chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi, who chaired the consultative meeting, was tasked with compilation of the suggestions received from the committee members. It was decided to forward the suggestions to the Union Home Minister for incorporation in the bill.

The proposed bill was discussed threadbare at the meeting. Right to equality guaranteed under the Indian Constitution attracted the attention of the speakers, who endorsed the purpose of the bill to impose the duty on the Centre and state governments to exercise power to prevent targeted violence, including mass violence against SCs, STs and linguistic and religious minorities. The features of the bill that came up for discussion included the definition of communal and targeted violence and imposition of penalty on public servants for dereliction of duty.

The speakers were satisfied that the relief and reparation, including compensation, would remain the same for all, including the dominant group. Some of them were apprehensive of the provision for setting up of the National Authority for Communal Harmony, Justice and Reparation, since its recommendations would not be binding.

The experts felt that the provision for penal action against public servants found guilty of dereliction of duty, was the most important feature of the bill. While underlining the urgent need for tabling the bill at the earliest opportunity, the experts pleaded for making it fool-proof.

No hole in the bill should be left for the opponents to take advantage of it. The participants decided to elicit maximum support for the bill and reach a consensus among all stakeholders.

The consultative meeting was attended, among others, by Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed, advocate, Supreme Court, Prof. Afzal Wani, Mr. M.U. Siddiqi, Mr. Riyaz Ahmad Salehi of Jamat Ahl-e-Hadis and Dr. Eqbal Husain of Jamia Millia Islamia.
Dr. A.I. Rahmatullah delivering his speech

proposed the vote of thanks. The programme started at 10.00 A.M. on 8th and ended at 5.00 p.m. on 9th November 2013. More than 70 research scholars and post graduate students attended the workshop. They were also given assignments to study and write term papers on select topics relevant to research.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CALL FOR PAPERS

2014 International Conference on World Islamic Studies (ICWIS2014) is the premier forum for the presentation of new advances and research results in the fields of theoretical, experimental, and applied World Islamic Studies. The conference will bring together leading researchers, engineers and scientists in the domain of interest from around the world. Topics of interest for submission include, but are not limited to:

- (Re)Focusing of Arab and Islamic Studies
- Political conflicts / Human rights
- Peace-building
- Education in the Arab and Islamic World
- Environmental issues / Globalization
- Oil / resources / economy Post/ Coloniality / Post/Modernity
- Questions of identity / Cultural pluralism
- Women / gender and Islam
- Authorship / literature
- Representation / media
- Arab arts and cinema
- Historical Islam / contemporary Islam
- Legal systems: religious and secular
- Religious diversity in the Arab World

All papers for the ICWIS2014 will be published in the IPEDR (ISSN: 2010-4626) as one volume, and will be included in the Engineering & Technology Digital Library, and indexed by EBSCO, World Cat, Google Scholar, Ulrich’s, Cross Ref and sent to be reviewed by ISI Proceedings.

Important Date
Paper Submission (Full Paper): Before January 10, 2014
Notification of Acceptance: On January 20, 2014
Final Paper Submission: Before February 5, 2014
Authors’ Registration: Before February 5, 2014
ICWIS 2014 Conference Dates: March 12-14, 2014

SUBMISSION METHODS:

1. Electronic Submission System; (.pdf)
If you can't login the submission system, please try to submit through method 2.
2. Email: icwis@iedrc.net (.pdf and .doc)

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This volume is a good contribution to the growing body of ethnographic literature on religious life in Central Asia; it adds substantively to the diverse perspectives on the practice of Islam in Uzbekistan that have begun to emerge as, in effect, pieces of a puzzle that no single study has yet attempted to integrate into a fuller picture, yet it suffers from some of the problems that plague nearly all recent ethnographic works on Central Asia, including an over-reliance on terminological discussion at the expense of the “voices” of the author’s informants, and a palpable reluctance to engage with any kind of historical perspective (beyond the Soviet era) that might illuminate religious life today. The book is at once a fine example of the recent advances beyond those facile approaches to religious life, and Islam, in Central Asia, that dominated the field in Soviet and early post-Soviet times, and a sign that much more must be done, practically and conceptually, for this region to reach qualitative parity with other parts of the Muslim world in terms of the study of religion.

The book is based on the author’s research stays from 1998-2000, and again in 2003-2004, centered in the Farghana valley (in Andijan and in a village for which the author uses a pseudonym) and in Samarqand. The task he sets for himself is to assess the impact of strict, and in practice mostly arbitrary, limitations on acceptable religious activity imposed by the government of Uzbekistan upon citizens seeking to cultivate their religious, or “moral,” selves in the aftermath of the Soviet state’s official hostility toward religion.

The introduction outlines his theoretical perspective on “morality” or ethics as a social phenomenon suitable for anthropological study; here begins what is to this reviewer’s eye an unhelpful and largely unnecessary foray into terminological quibbling. The author gratifyingly rejects definitions of his subject that focus only on “belief” or the doctrinal “tenets” of Islam, and he combines in his purview those elements of belief with shrine-linked practices, life-cycle rites, healing ceremonies, and so forth; but he then insists that this complex of beliefs and practices, and the broader question of what it means to be a Muslim, are “moral” issues, repeatedly reminding us, in effect, that labeling them “religious” would detract from his work.

One senses here, and throughout the book, that he is uncomfortable with the term “religion,” and so seeks another term to contain what some might be content to call “religious” life; he insists, indeed, that “religion,” however construed, could not be useful category for analyzing and understanding “lived Islam” in Central Asia (pp. 34-35). Even his fine discussion (pp. 18-19) of religiosity’s social context, countering the focus purely on “belief” and knowledge, culminates in patently convoluted phrasing that seems intended to withhold the label “Islamic” from the “sociality” in which “moral selfhood” that is Muslim (but also, evidently, non-Muslim selves) may be developed. Even after further examples of such wording (e.g., statements recoiling from the suggestion “that the sociality of Muslims in Uzbekistan is itself Islam” [p. 63]), the author in fact never addresses what he means, or what should be meant, by “Islamic” or “Muslim,” and his use of these labels, as well as of “religion” and “morality,” becomes quite arbitrary and seems purely idiosyncratic.

The first chapter describes the socio-economic context in the two locales in which he conducted his research, and includes a refreshingly honest appraisal of the author’s own evolution from expecting, but not finding, a particular kind of religious activity or discourse (and by extension, categorizing what he did find as “national” or “cultural” rather than “religious”), to broadening his understanding beyond “obviously Islamic practice” (p. 31) to encompass a wider range of activities that comprise the living of Muslim lives; his acknowledgment of what he missed because he was not looking for it (p. 32) is a good antidote to the many self-
assured pronouncements about religion, or its absence or insignificance, in Central Asia to appear in print over the past few decades.

The author next foregrounds state policy and its impact on religious life, offering in chapter 2 a synthetic discussion of policy toward religion during the Soviet period, and in chapter 3 examining constructions of “good” and “bad” Islam in the post-Soviet era, outlining the emergence of “authentic” cultural practices that could be identified as Uzbek national traditions as the centerpiece of the state’s construction of a good, tolerated, and even official promoted Islam. One wonders if he is not providing an updated, but no less misleading, contrast along the lines of the Sovietological constructions of “official Islam” vs. “unofficial” or “parallel” or “underground” Islam; indeed, the author goes too far, to this reviewer’s mind, in equating government-tolerated Islam with “national” manifestations of Muslim religious practice, insofar as the state also supports, if less directly (and quite ironically), the official religious board that sponsors scripturalist madrasa training and contributes in other ways as well as to the production of critiques of various aspects of the “national” practice of Islam. In the end it is discussions of the ambiguity introduced by current state policies regarding religion that seem most compelling.

Chapter 4, “The Practical Hegemony of State Discourse,” considers ways in which citizens of Uzbekistan “express themselves as Muslim” while subject to an authoritarian regime that severely limits the range of acceptable Islamic practice; here the dichotomy noted above is more firmly entrenched, as the author proposes to discuss discourses that diverge from that of the state, but in fact begins with the jadidists and discusses only “reformist” discourse. Nevertheless, this chapter includes an interesting account of a case of traditionalist/reformist conflict, noting the potential for some citizens to manipulate the state discourse of “good” and “bad” Islam in order to settle scores.

In chapter 5, the author discusses what he calls “experience as a site for moral reasoning,” focusing first on “moral sources,” defined as “the transcendent locations that give experience its moral quality” (p. 154). This chapter offers some good descriptions of religious life in post-Soviet Uzbekistan; again, however, one misses a broader historical perspective, beyond a review of “state” policies, entailing sensitivity to the fabric of Muslim religious life in earlier times. Reading the account of a rite during which a participant recounted a narrative of the Prophet, for instance, one is reminded of the irony that anthropological accounts typically pay little attention to such narratives, or to the exegesis offered by those who recount or hear them; these are prime venues in which to examine what we might call, following the author, the inscription of a Muslim self, and indeed the “moral reasoning” at work therein, but instead this work, like others of the genre, features far more observation and “free-form” discussion by informants (not to mention extrinsic theoretical intrusions) than the kind of grounded self-referential and “ived” exegesis that might reflect, and be compared with, historical records. Such exegetical discourses might have been missed, or left unelicited, because ethnographers did not think to ask for them (or because they were too closely linked with the category of “religion”); this in itself detracts from our overall understanding.

Likewise, reading the account of “the Teacher” (pp. 167-72) and the decidedly “unorthodox” religious hybrid he evidently purveys, one laments that such life stories are not compared with those recorded, or constructed, in the rich hagiographical literature of earlier times, as is done in ethnographies of South Asian Muslims; for Central Asia, anthropologists are content to give the impression that such figures are sui generis, or at best emerge on the model of Soviet-era religious figures – much in the same way that they are content to suggest that contemporary post-Soviet religious debates or alignments go no deeper than the Soviet era and bear no historical “weighting” in terms of relative valorization.

Chapters 6 and 7 present examples of religious healing, from the perspective of the “patients” and of the healers, respectively. Chapter 6 includes a long discussion of one informant’s narrative of his rediscovery of Islam, involving a recovery from illness. In chapter 7 (a revised version of an article published in 2006), the author considers the healers themselves, and the different engagements with scripturalist Islam they represent. The author argues that accounts of “magic” and spiritual healing should be taken seriously from the standpoint of those who experience them, and not simply assumed to be masks for other “real” phenomena; to some extent the author himself them resorts to such a mask, i.e., his rhetoric of “moral reasoning” and the development of Muslim selves, but his caution against the impulse to “decode” such accounts is well presented, and well-taken.

The eighth and final chapter bears a title (“Experience, Intelligibility, and Tradition”) suggesting that the sort of definitional pedantry found elsewhere in the book will be resumed; it is, to some extent, but the chapter begins with the author’s insightful observation of the paradox posed by religion in Uzbekistan today, namely the fact of severe state regulation of religion vs. the “riot of exploration” regarding religion (p. 230).

The impression one takes from the book, in the end, is of a solid ethnographic discussion that nevertheless suffers from a failure to engage substantively with historical perspectives; one might protest that this is not the ethnographer’s job, and indeed the author himself comes close to arguing for a sort of “fundamentalist” ethnography in which only the present matters (pp. 216-17), but the well-known peculiarities of the study of Islam in Central Asia make it clear that the present will not be understood if
studied without reference to historical evidence. Evading historical discussion may be justifiable in certain contexts, but doing so instantly renders a host of issues addressed in this study problematical, beginning with the author’s approach to the “debates” over what is and is not properly Islamic in contemporary Uzbekistan. On the surface an “even-handed” approach seems laudable, but historical trajectories do matter, as do arguments about such trajectories; to pretend that the contending views are simply on equal terms and that history adds no “weight” to one side is to distort our understanding of the present. For instance, the author often notes the claim by some of his informants (the more Salafist-inclined) that the religious practices they deride as contrary to the Qur’an and the hadiths are legacies of the corrupting effects of the Soviet era; it is not difficult to reject such claims, on the basis of historical evidence from the pre-Soviet era, and even if it is not the author’s business to note such evidence when discussing the issue with his informants, it again does a disservice to the reader to pretend that the two sides are on an equal footing. In the end, an attempt to focus on the ever-shifting timeless “pivot” between past and future, with no sense of historically-framed social or intellectual momentum, is doomed to misrepresent the present.

Reviewed by Devin DeWeese

Contd. from page-8

The most frustrating for the educated youth is what they think or regard as the failure of globalization/economic liberalization. The general hope among the educated youth was that globalization will improve their conditions. But what they see is that globalization has made the rich richer and the poor poorer. They also see that banks and financial institutions offer help in the form of loans only to those who have the means to pay back. Thus, the lowly-paid workers are not benefitting from the liberalized economy.

But it is mainly the corruption in high places as well as in lower and higher bureaucracy which has antagonized the people the most. Delhi is an aware and knowledgeable society and people find it difficult to get their genuine and legal works done. We can imagine how the system may be working in the so called sick states. People have not just to run from pillar to pillar but also have to pay bribe for most genuine work being done.

Other public offices rendering one or another kind of service work more or less in similar fashion. You have to pay bribe in cash if you look a capable man. If you look poor, you have to put your faith in God than hope in vain that the system will do your work.

One can imagine or understand why people are flocking to the AAP just because it has promised to end corruption. And believe it that not only the common man but also the educated people specially the qualified youth who are paid poorly despite working from dawn to dust, are joining the AAP hoping it would change their condition. There are also people, professors, doctors, executives and media professionals etc. who are joining the party because they know how corruption has harmed the country and therefore want to change the existing system. Many of them are also unsatisfied with unchecked economic globalization and liberalization which compels them to join this movement for change.

The AAP is a phenomenon, a movement which has achieved success in Delhi assembly polls. And circumstances so developed that they have formed government. There is a lot of passion and good intention at work. But along with good intension one must be willing to learn all the time. This is the only way to overcome the inexperience which, at the moment, is the main shortcoming of the AAP. The AAP, beside being ready to learn, has also to be vigilant. It would be a fatal mistake if the AAP underestimates the corrupt. Corruption is intelligent, resourceful and widespread and therefore can not be wiped out so easily or quickly. The AAP therefore, has to prepare people for a long battle ahead.

I have just said that corruption is intelligent. It might seek entry into AAP by becoming its member or through donations. This is how the enemy within is created and the enemy within, as we all know, is more dangerous than the enemy without. Moreover, you easily know the outside enemy but it’s very difficult to discover the enemy within. It requires constant vigilance, both from within and outside, to discover and eliminate the enemy that resides in you. We hope that the AAP would eagerly listen to all criticism to keep going on the right path.

As the AAP is all set to become a national party, it would be required to announce its economic and foreign policy. Perhaps it would like to continue with the time-tested non-alignment though practically the concept is dead. It should, therefore, adopt a pro-active foreign policy with emphasis on developing good relations with neighbouring countries. There are people in Japan and Southeast Asia who stand for Asian renaissance. The Japanese idea was to strengthen the Southeast Asian economy through intensive mutual cooperation.

Some Malasian politicians/thinkers want it to cover entire Asia. Some people in our country, who exercise great influence on Congress and BJP, want that concept of Asian renaissance should not extend beyond India. The obvious reason is Pakistan which, according to this narrow thinking, can not be a reliable partner. The AAP must rise above such narrow considerations. Their policy should focus on the greater goal and not on Pakistan as a road block. A deep thinking would reveal to us that the future of world economy depends on Asia’s performance. And Asia would perform only when it would think in economic terms. Our petty jealousies and boundary disputes have only rendered us vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. We, therefore, have to think on the line that greater economic cooperation and inter-dependence will solve our other
problems also. Since the middle ages the Indian sub-continent from Kabul to Kolkata and from Kashmir to Kannya Kumari has been one economic entity; the Asian renaissance seeks to extend it to include China, central and southwest Asia. Obviously India and Pakistan occupy a vital strategic position if the concept of Asian renaissance has to be put into practice. Our foreign policy, therefore, must be focused on solving regional problems in order to facilitate economic cooperation which surely will bring about unprecedented economic prosperity and put an end to poverty and illiteracy that has been afflicting India since ages.

The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh wholeheartedly adopted globalization and economic liberalization; in fact it only continued with what was started and promoted by Narsimha Rao and Vajpai governments. Initially it paid rich dividends and people, by and large, were happy. The mistake that the governments as well as intellectuals including the media made was that they failed to warn people that by embracing economic globalization and liberalization India had joined the world market and whatever will happen there will affect us, both adversely as well as favourably. Today the world economy is in recession which has a direct bearing on India. Congress, BJP or AAP can’t do anything in this regard unless the state takes protective measures which would not be free from risks. Therefore the AAP needs to study and think deep to evolve its economic policy.

And this last thing is for the AAP leadership. The success in Delhi has generated hope all across the country. The youth, the future of our nation, are especially looking towards it with great hope. The AAP experience in Delhi must succeed because a failure will trigger deep depression across the country, particularly among the youth which, in plain words, would be a national disaster.

By this he meant that the true criterion of national prosperity is not export-import surpluses or per capita income but rather the potential to construct and maintain an economic infrastructure that is globally competitive without foreign assistance. By that criterion, Saudi Arabia, like every OPEC country, including Iran, remains underdeveloped and therefore dependent on others for what it needs to exist and to compete as a modern nation.

From Shattering the Myth by Bruce B. Lawrence, pp. 51-52

Calendar 2014

The IOS calendar 2014 has been published. Agents, Shop-keepers and others may place their order with the IOS Headquarters.

The Four-Page calendar has the following feature:

Page-1 Mosques through the Ages
Page-3 World: Country-wise Diabetes Prevalence (%) 1995, 2000 and 2010 for Population (Number of Adults ages>=20 years)
Page-4 India: Distribution of Pre-matric Scholarship for Muslim Minority Community students 2010-11 & 2011-12

The calendar may also be obtained from

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We are witnessing a pleasant unusual time. The rise of AAP has not just surprised political pundits but has also upset calculations. One thing is clear: there is a great mass desire for change. People want change for various reasons. The main reason, however, is that they are unsatisfied with the functioning of the existing system. Generally people think that rules are okay but the system is so corrupt that the delivery of goods to the people has become paralyzed, if not impossible. They also feel that politicians, by and large, are either corrupt or incompetent and therefore unable to deliver or serve the people. For most people politics today is self service than public service.

The AAP is intelligent and smart enough to read the public mood. In fact the top AAP leadership has genuinely been connected with common people through the non-government organizations (NGOs) they manage and run. Their deep connection with the people has enabled them to understand their problems. It has also enabled them to see corruption as major obstacle in delivering services to the public.

There is another thing that the AAP has understood better than other political formations. Delhi is home to large numbers of migrant groups who have come here from all over the country. A tiny minority like bureaucrats and technocrats has come here and settled for various reasons. These people, being influential as they are, hardly face any problem. But other migrants, a great unprivileged majority, face a lot of problems. A great majority of the under-privileged majority has come from UP, Bihar and Bengal. Earlier migration of people to Delhi was from Haryana, Punjab and Western UP. A good numbers of early migrants have done well but a lot many feel that their fortunes have not changed for good and they blame their failure on the corrupt system and traditional politics.

The migrants from Eastern UP, Bihar and Bengal, barring a tiny minority of educated ones, are poor people. They are daily wage earners, doing a variety of odd jobs. A great majority works in unorganized sectors where they are generally exploited. As the corrupt and incompetent Delhi Development Authority (DDA) failed to provide them accommodation, they developed what is dubbed as unauthorized colonies. Many are so poor and marginalized that they are living in slums. The political parties, particularly Congress, have until now been their champion. In the beginning these people – marginalized and semi-marginalised – had the problems of electricity, water and ration cards etc. The Congress leaders stepped in, gave them ration cards and in last few years, electricity and water also and as a result reaped electoral dividends for many years.

Delhi also attracts large number of students from all over the country. These students are mainly from small towns and villages. After completing their education most students do not return to their villages and towns and seek jobs in Delhi and other metropolitan cities. They are also joined by the students pouring in Delhi from small towns after completing their education. All or most of them find jobs here but they are under-paid. A few, who got good jobs, have not been able to progress further due to economic recession. They see affluence in Delhi and develop the feelings that while all others are progressing, they are stagnant in their old position. These people see hope in the rise of AAP.