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Churchill
took over the Colonial Office at a time when the West Asian problem seemed
to have become intractable. The Arabs were bitter, specilly the
Iraqis had risen in rebellion in 1920. The Zionists were putting
pressure to implement the Balfour Declaration which the Arabs naturally
opposed tooth and nail. All these had not only raised the political
stakes but also put tremendous strains Britain’s treasury. All though history the British have been a money-minded (money-conscious, if they take offence) people. They would not spend a single pound on military adventure without the hope of multiplied returns. They occupied India for economic gains; they occupied or controlled coastal towns from the Suez Canal to the Persian. Gulf (that were vital for Indian security) and spent money on maintaining their occupation because India was their most prized possession. But what for they had occupied the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and for what economic gains they were maintaining a costly military presence in the region, asked the money-conscious Britishers. The British government had admitted just before the outbreak of the rebellion in Iraq in 1920 that the cost of maintaining occupation forces in the Arab world was a whopping ₤ 750,000/- per week. There were already 14000 British and 46000 Indian troops in Iraq which consumed the bulk of the above-mentioned amount. Because the British had comparatively lesser number of troops elsewhere; 9500 at Constantinople and the Turkish Straits, 9000 in Palestine and 6000 in Egypt. In 1920-21 Churchill estimated the annual cost of his country'’ involvement in Iraq and Palestine to be ₤18 and ₤ 9 million respectively. The British public was questioning these high expenditure when in mid 1920 the government decided to dispatch large numbers of troops to quell the Iraqi rebellion which made the public even more furious. The press bitterly criticized the government’s Middle East Policy; Lawrence also published critical letters in newspapers questioning the wisdom of British policy in Iraq. Viewing his renewed interest in West Asia Churchill obtained his services. On his advice the British airplanes bombed even dropped mustard gas bombs to punish the rebellious Iraqis into submission. Thereafter, the Royal Air force became Britain’s main force to harass the Arabs into obedience; this also enabled the government to cut its forces in the region but its military presence was still costing ₤ 37,000,000 yearly to the British Exchequer, more than enough ammunition to fire criticism at the government. Such
were the domestic conditions when Churchill became Colonial Secretary at
the start of 1921. In consultation with his officers, particularly
with the help of Lawrence, he devised a scheme to settle the West Asian
problem. His main concern was reducing the cost of his government’s
involvement in the area. Lawrence’s old scheme, when slightly
modified, seemed to him as perfectly suitable. His idea was to use
the Hashemites once again to serve the British interests, and who could
have helped him better than Lawrence in this exercise Lawrence
accepted Churchill’s offer not to do justice to the betrayed Arabs but
to use his influence with the Hashemites in order to promote his country’s
interests. He advised Churchill to install Faisal in Iraq as king
and Abdullah as Amir of Transjordan (now Jordan only). Husayn, the
father of the two, was to rule in Hijaz if he accepted the Anglo-French
Mandates over Syria, Palestine and Iraq. With this scheme in mind,
Churchill traveled to Egypt to preside over the so called Cairo
Conference. What transpired at the Conference is a known history:
They divided Islam against itself. (From the Ummah, Pan-Islamism and Muslim and Nation-States by I. Danish pp.146-148) |